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Social Media Censorship in Times of Political Unrest: 
A Social Simulation Experiment with the UK Riots 
 
by 
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Paola Tubaro 
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,W¶VWLPHZHKHDUd a little bit less about the economic and sociological justifications  
for what is in my view nothing less than wanton criminality. 
Boris Johnson, Mayor of London, Clapham, 9 August 2011 
 
We are not social scientists. We have to deal with urgent situations. 
Paul McKeever, Police Federation Chairman, SkyNews, 11 August 2011 
 
 
 
 
Résumé 
Censure des médias sociaux en période de troubles politiques : Une expérience de 
simulation sociale sur les émeutes au Royaume-Uni. 
A la suite de la vague d'agitation politique de 2011, allant du printemps arabe aux 
émeutes britanniques, la formation d'un large consensus autour de la censure de 
l'Internet est en cours. Cet article adopte une approche de simulation sociale pour 
montrer que la décision de réglementer, de filtrer ou de censurer les médias sociaux 
dans des situations de conflit change les formes de la contestation, et aboutit finalement 
à des niveaux plus élevés de violence. Dans un développement du modèle à base 
G¶DJHQWV de Epstein (2002), plusieurs scénarios alternatifs sont créés /¶Rptimum 
systémique, représenté par l'absence complète de la censure, non seulement correspond 
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à des niveaux plus faibles de violence dans le temps, mais permet de connaître de 
longues périodes de paix sociale après chaque éclatement. 
 
Abstract 
Following the 2011 wave of political unrest, extending from the Arab Spring to the UK 
riots, the formation of a large consensus around Internet censorship is underway. The 
present paper adopts a social simulation approach to show that the decision to 
³UHJXODWH´ ILOWHURU FHQVRU VRFLDOPHGLD LQ VLWXDWLRQVRIXQUHVW FKDQJHV WKHSDWWHUQRI
civil protest and ultimately results in higher levels of violence. Building on Epstein's 
(2002) agent-based model, several alternative scenarios are generated. The systemic 
optimum, represented by complete absence of censorship, not only corresponds to 
lower levels of violence over time, but allows for significant periods of social peace 
after each outburst. 
 
Mots clefs 
Violence civile au Royaume-Uni, Censure de l'Internet, Modèles de simulation multi-agents, 
Simulation sociale, Médias sociaux, Flash mobs. 
 
Keywords 
UK Civil Violence, Internet Censorship, Agent-based Modelling, Social Simulation, 
Social Media, Flash Mobs 
 
 
 
The Political Role of Social Media - Moving away from Double 
Standards 
 
In the wake of August 2011 outburst of civil unrest in the UK, several voices from the 
mainstream media and diverse political figures, from London Mayor technology 
adviser Mike Butcher1 up to Prime Minister David Cameron himself,2 have pointed the 
finger at social media use as playing a major role in the riots. 
Meetings between government officials and representatives of the main social 
networking platforms involved (Facebook, Twitter and BBM) have been held to 
establish guidelines for a more stringent regulation of social media and Internet 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ LQ JHQHUDO WR DYRLG WDFWLFDO XVH RI PRELOH QHWZRUNV E\ ULRW ³IODVK
PREV´ RU WR FRXQWHU RQOLQH VRFLDO LQIOXHQFH PHFKDQLVPV 7KH ,QWHUQHW NLOO VZLWFK
solution (temporary shutdown of entire telecommunication networks), infamously and 
ineffectively attempted in Egypt during the January 2011 revolutionary outbreak, has 
also been proposed. 
7KH SDUDOOHO EHWZHHQ WKH UHJXODWLQJ IUHQ]\ RI %ULWDLQ¶V &RQVHUYDWLYH
government and the disastroXV HOHFWURQLF FHQVRUVKLS RI +RVQL 0XEDUDFN¶V G\LQJ
                                                     
1
  See Mail Online, 8 August 2011, at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2023924/London-riots-2011-
BlackBerry-Messenger-shut-unbelievable.html. 
2
  See Forbes, 12 August 2011, at http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2011/08/12/britain-to-censor-twitter-
facebook-other-social-media-sites/. 
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regime, highlights the utterly ambiguous attitude of the European political 
establishment and mainstream media towards Internet social communication. In a 
(regrettably not infrequent) display of duplicity, the same information technologies that 
had been presented as tools of liberation in the height of the Arab Spring, have been 
portrayed as threats to the very values of freedom and peace that Western governments 
allegedly stand for. 
So the question of why social media would bring democracy to developing 
countries and anarchy to Western ones remains open. Some analysts interpret this 
contradiction as a strategy which, by creating a climate of moral panic surrounding 
popular culture, distracts from, and smoothes away, the societal issues underlying the 
uprisings (Fuchs, 2011). 
These arguments have received a cold welcome from British authorities, 
ZRUULHG WKDW ³HFRQRPLF DQG VRFLRORJLFDO´ H[SODQDWLRQV RI WKH  HYHQWV ZRXOG EH
XVHG DV ³MXVWLILFDWLRQV´ RI PRUH and more confrontational means of political dissent. 
The positions expressed by Conservative politicians have prompted diverse reactions in 
the academic community. The presidency of the British Sociological Association 
maintained that systemic factors (such as social and economic inequalities or racism) 
account for macro-EHKDYLRXUVRI³LUUDWLRQDO´FURZGVSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQWKHULRWV3 Others, 
like some of the participants in the Academy of Social Sciences October 2011 seminar,4 
have insisted on compliance to norms as a key element in determining individual 
propensity towards civil violence. These distinct approaches to the explanation of social 
behaviour, and to personal responsibility, challenge and complexify the reductive 
portrayal of social sciences as a homogenous ethos of liberal apologists of the riots. 
$XWKRULWLHV¶ DEVWUDFW GHQXQFLDWLRQ RI VRFLDO UHVHDUFKHUV LV LQ WKLV VHQVH QRW
representative of the range of positions expressed within our scientific community. 
Acknowledging the variety of these reactions can be considered the first step towards a 
PRUH LQIRUPHG IRUPXODWLRQRI WKHSUHVHQWSDSHU¶V UHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQZKDWFDQZH DV
social scientists, say about the role of social media in assisting or even encouraging 
widespread political conflict? Very little, it may appear, insofar as data on actual social 
media use and traffic were only sparsely available during the UK riots. In the aftermath, 
large amounts of data and messages automatically harvested via social media were 
made available to some researchers and journalists.5 Yet the limitations of such 
SULYDWHO\ RZQHG ³ELJ GDWD´ LQ WHUPV RI FRVW FRPSOHWHQHVV DQG HWKLFDO YLDELOLW\ DUH
increasingly highlighted by the scientific community.6 
To deliver a robust, insightful explanation of such complex social processes, we 
adopt an innovative ethno-computational approach, relying on an empirically-informed 
agent-based social simulation. This methodology, proposed in Tubaro and Casilli 
                                                     
3
  See the open letter published on 11 August 2011 in The Guardian, at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/11/sociologists-offer-unravel-riots. 
4
 The Riots of Summer 2011  - Causes, Calamities and Consequences, Gresham College, London, 13 October 2011. 
(for an account, see http://www.socialsciencespace.com/2011/10/the-riots-of-summer-2011-seminar-organised-by-
the-campaign-for-social-science/). 
5
 One prospectively interesting empirical research project was started in September 2011 by The Guardian and LSE 
targeting 1,100 defendants appeared in court for riot-related charges and a database of 2.5 million tweets.  
6
 For a discussion of these points, see boyd and Crawford (2011). 
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(2010), is based on three tenants: 1) collecting a small set of qualitative data touching 
on the target social process; 2) using these data to define a set of behavioural and 
relational rules for a population of artificial agents implemented in a computer-based 
environment; 3) generate scenarios that enable exploring the implications of these rules 
by simulating iteratively interactions among these agents. 
For the purpose of this research, given specific time and ethical constraints,7 we 
KDYH UHOLHG RQ D ³UDSLG HWKQRJUDSK\´ DV RXWOLQHG LQ 0LOOHQ  XVLQJ IHZ NH\
informants, capturing rich field data through observation at multiple and interactive 
points (both onsite and via electronic media), and collaborative qualitative data analysis 
(notably comments to our blogs and social media profiles). 
The resulting computer-generated socially consistent scenarios have led us to 
detect and assess key factors coming into play within the specific process under 
investigation. One of these factors is the use of social media to organize flash mobs and 
to build field awareness in urban uprising settings. 
The present paper aims to show that the decision to repress or censor social 
media in a situation of civil unrest ± beyond the negative cultural consequences of 
repression of freedom of expression ± is suboptimal even as to its expected impact on 
civil violence.  
 
 
(SVWHLQ¶V&LYLO9LROHQFH0RGHO5HYLVLWHG 
 
Social scientists have been modelling civil violence via agent-based simulation for 
almost a decade now.8 One major contribution ± upon which our own simulation model 
will build ± is contained in an article published by Josh Epstein in 2002 (Epstein, 
 (SVWHLQ¶V PRGHO OLNH DOO DJHQW-based simulations, is a game-like computer 
model based on a set of simple rules ± and generates complex results. Basically it 
describes a society where there is only one type of social agent (represented by circles 
in Figure 1). Of course this is an oversimplification, but one which is functional to 
avoid political splits between insurgents and law-DELGLQJFLWL]HQV³ORRWHUV´DQG³FOHDQ-
XS FDPSDLJQHUV´ ³JDQJVWHUV´ DQG ³FRPPXQLW\ KHURHV´ LQ WKH UDWKHU FUXGH
FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQVRIWHQDGRSWHGE\8.&RQVHUYDWLYHPLOLHXVLQ$XJXVW(SVWHLQ¶V
standard social agent is an ideal-typical individual that can, according to his/her context 
of social interaction, adopt a violent style of expression of political dissent. 
7KHDJHQW¶VEHKDYLRXULVLQIOXHQFHGE\VHYHUDOYDULDEOHVWKHILUVWRQHEHLQJLWV
SHUVRQDO OHYHO RI SROLWLFDO GLVVDWLVIDFWLRQ ³JULHYDQFH´ 7KLV FDQ OHDG WKH DJHQW WR
abandon its state of calm and become an active protester. However, the decision to act 
± whether it is to go on a looting spree or to engage in violent demonstrations ± is 
FRQGLWLRQHG E\ WKH DJHQW¶V VRFLDO VXUURXQGLQJV ³QHLJKERXUKRRG´ LQ WKH PRGHO¶V
language). Does it detect the presence of police in the surroundings? If the answer to 
                                                     
7
 The University of Greenwich Research Ethics Committee has imposed stringent requirements (such as obtaining 
formal consent from the organization of any person recruited in the context of their employment) and exclusion 
FULWHULD³WKRVHZKRKDYHZLWQHVVHGLOOHJDODFWVDQGZKRDUHSDUWRIDQ\RQJRLQJLQYHVWLJDWLRQZKHWKHUDVDZLWQHVV
RURWKHUZLVH´ 
8
 A summary of these researches is contained in Amblard et al. (2010). 
5 
WKLVTXHVWLRQLV³QR´LWZLOODFW,IWKHDQVZHULV³\HV´DQRWKHUTXHVWLRQLVDVNHGLVWKLV
police presence counterbalanced by a sufficient number of actively protesting citizens? 
If the answer to this sHFRQG TXHVWLRQ LV ³\HV´ WKHQ WKH DJHQW DFWV 6RPHWLPHV LQ DQ
utterly random way, one of the active citizens gets caught by the police and is sent to 
jail for a given period of time. Again, the apparent simplicity of this rule is sadly 
consistent with the many episodes of arrests in confused and sometimes arbitrary 
round-XSV WULJJHUHGE\ WKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VDGRSWLRQRIDKDUG OLQH LQGHDOLQJZLWK
riot repression. 
The model takes into account other factors that might mitigate civil violence, 
such as government legitimacy and the perceived risk of being arrested. Agents have 
the possibility of moving from one place to another on the social grid to team up with 
other protesters and engage in coordinated actions. This point will be specifically 
addressed in the next paragraph, given its significance to the tactical use of social 
media.9 
7KHPDLQUHVXOWRI(SVWHLQ¶VPRGHOLVWKDWLQDW\SLFDOVLWXDWLRQFLYLOYLROHQFH
does not look like a linear progression. Naïve visions of political conflict as a 
cumulative process, where confrontation escalates until a regime is toppled, turn out to 
EH IDOODFLRXV 7LPHV RI XQUHVW EULQJ IRUWK ZKDW (SVWHLQ GHVFULEHV DV D ³SXQFWXDWHG
HTXLOLEULXP´VHH)LJXUH ORQJSHULRGVRIVWDELOLW\ZKHUH UHEHOOLRQ LVVPRXOGHULQJ
are followed by short violent outbursts. 
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 1. A typical civil unrest pattern - outbursts of violence (red curve) punctuate 
long periods of stability when political tension is building up (blue curve) 
Source: Epstein (2002), Fig. 8. 
 
$QRWKHUYDULDEOHZKLFK(SVWHLQ FDOOHG ³YLVLRQ´ WXUQVRXW WREH FUXFLDO 9LVLRQ LV DQ
LQGLYLGXDO DJHQW¶V DELOLW\ WR VFDQ KLVKHU QHLJKERXUKRRG IRU VLJQV RI SROLFH RIILFHUV
DQGRUDFWLYHSURWHVWHUV7KHKLJKHUWKHYLVLRQWKHJUHDWHUWKHDJHQW¶VDZDUeness of its 
surroundings, and the range of possible actions available. 
,Q8UL:LOHQVN\ EXLOW DQ DGDSWDWLRQRI(SVWHLQ¶VRULJLQDOPRGHO IRU WKH
agent-based simulation package Netlogo, making it freely available online (Wilensky, 
1999, 2004). Taking his contribution as a starting point, we have developed a new 
version of the model,10 also programmed in Netlogo, to evaluate the tactical use of 
social media to create flash mobs deployed in a situation of civil violence. 
Our innovation with respect to the original model is twofold. Firstly, we have 
UHLQWHUSUHWHG³YLVLRQ´LQWHUPVRIFHQVRUVKLS± with high levels of vision corresponding 
to low censorship, and vice versa. Secondly, and more importantly, we have modified 
                                                     
9
 In this paper, tactical use of social media designates the adoption of informal and ad-hoc practices of electronic 
communication (mainly geolocative media, social networking, texting, and real-time computer conferencing) for the 
purpose of temporary political confrontation. Our definition stems from Garcia and Lovink (1997). 
10
 The Netlogo file, the simulation code, and an html version of our model is available online at 
http://www.bodyspacesociety.eu/uk-riots/. 
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WKH FRQVHTXHQFHV RI ³YLVLRQ´ ,Q WKH RUiginal simulation, agents and police officers 
move to randomly chosen places within their vision range. Conversely, in our model a 
different rule has been introduced to make agents move to places in their vision range 
that are surrounded by the maximum number of active protesters.11 This simple change 
simulates the behaviour of individuals involved in civil unrest, using BBM or Twitter to 
detect, and to converge in, hot spots. The result of the modified model is thus consistent 
with the tactical use of mobile technologies by protesters to gain a situational advantage 
over police forces and have a better awareness of the field, its resources and possible 
weak spots. If the value of vision is higher (as in a situation where online networking 
tools are widespread and not censored), each agent has fairly complete information as 
to what is going on even in remote locations. If social communication is censored, the 
value of vision is lower, and agents have partial or non-existent awareness of their 
surroundings and tend to move randomly. 
 
 
Internet Censorship - A Source of Protracted High-level Violence 
 
Our social simulation code reproduces the functioning of a social system (presumably 
an urban setting, such as a city or a borough) over a relatively long period of time (in 
practice and for modelling purposes, 1,000 time steps),12 for different values of the 
parameter vision caeteris paribus (see Table 2 in the Appendix). Graphically, the 
Netlogo implementation of the model represents social agents as green circles, all the 
more dark as their levels of grievance are high. Active protesters turn red and jailed 
protesters black; police officers appear as blue triangles (Figure 2). 
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 2. A hypothetical social system, as can be represented graphically in the model, 
at time 0 (left panel) and after some time steps (central and right panels). 
Legend: Circles represent social agents, whose level of grievance is indicated by lighter or darker shades 
of green. Active protesters are coloured red and jailed protesters black. Blue triangles represent police 
RIILFHUVJUH\DUHDVDUHHPSW\6RXUFHDXWKRUV¶HODERUDWLRQ 
 
Running the model several times generates alternative scenarios (Figure 3), and allows 
the comparison of outcomes of lower or higher values of vision ± indicating the effects 
of more or less censorship of social media. 
                                                     
11
 Another option, suggested to us by an anonymous activist blogger from London, would be to introduce a rule 
according to which groups of rioters converge in areas where a high number of police officers are attacking isolated 
DJHQWV 7KLV ³SROLFH EUXWDOLW\´ UXOH PLJKW Ee introduced in a subsequent extension of the Netlogo software, and 
would provide another eyewitness-based structural validation of the model. 
12
 The choice of 1,000 time steps aims to provide a sufficiently long time to observe the asymptotic behaviour of the 
model, and is consistent with the time horizon of many of the simulation runs featured in Epstein (2002) and in 
subsequent interpretations of the model (see Kim and Hanneman, 2011). The empirical interpretation of time steps 
(whether they would represent hours, days, or months) is not attempted here as it would require appropriate time 
series data. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 3. Red patterns represent number of violent protesters over time with different 
levels of social media censorship 
Legend: Levels from 0 vision (total censorship, upper left) to 10 vision (no censorship, lower right). 
6RXUFHDXWKRUV¶HODERUDWLRQ 
 
Different patterns of civil unrest over time are generated by different values of vision. 
All scenarios display an initial outburst, but the subsequent evolution of the overall 
number of agents engaged in active violent behaviour (red line) is influenced by the 
level of censorship government applies on social media. In the case of total censorship 
(vision = 0), the level of violence stays at its maximum virtually forever (a scenario 
reminiscent of the Egyptian situation, where an escalation of protests followed the 
decision to block Internet access). The other cases correspond to less and less 
censorship. Values between 1 (almost complete censorship) and 9 (almost no 
censorship) correspond to different levels of protracted civil unrest: the stronger the 
censorship, the higher the average level of endemic violence over time (best linear fit 
represented by the black lines in Figure 3). 
The last case, corresponding to highest vision (and thus virtually no censorship) 
deserves further comment. Apparently this situation is characterised by incessant high-
level outbursts of violence, with peak active levels that seem to be even more sizeable 
than in other cases. Yet, the average level of violence over time (black fitting trend 
line) remains among the lowest. Moreover, if we want to measure the magnitude of 
violent outbursts, their peak active level is not an appropriate measure. Looking at time 
inteUYDOV EHWZHHQ RXWEXUVWV DW WKH GXUDWLRQ RI RXWEXUVWV DQG DW WKH OHYHO RI ³VRFLDO
SHDFH´EHWZHHQRXWEXUVWVKHOSVXVGLVFRYHUWKDWWKLVVFHQDULRLVDFWXDOO\WKHV\VWHPLF
optimum. In the absence of censorship, agents protest, sometimes violently, 
nevertheless they are able to return to significant levels of calm (green line in Figure 4), 
when social unrest is halted. 
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 4. In the absence of censorship, high levels of social unrest are possible (see 
peaks in red line), but between uprisings, the social system is able to come back to 
significant levels of calm (green line) 
6RXUFHDXWKRUV¶HODERUDWLRQ 
 
This is the only scenario where active protest drops to zero for extended and repeated 
periods of time (see Table 1 in the Appendix). Although this situation ± consistent with 
ZKDW (SVWHLQ GHVFULEHG DV ³SXQFWXDWHG HTXLOLEULXP´ LQ KLV RULJLQDO PRGHO RI FLYLO
violence ± does not seem to match a complete and consistent (and empirically unlikely) 
³VRFLDO SHDFH´ LW VWLOO FRUUHVSRQds to a state where citizens are free to voice their 
dissent on social media, to coordinate their efforts and act about it ± albeit in 
8 
confrontational ways ± while still enjoying a higher level of calm over time (see Figure 
5). 
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 5. Levels of civil violence as function of levels of censorship - Higher vision 
means less censorship and less civil violence 
Legend: In the absence of online censorship, social agents have maximum vision (here, equal to 10). This 
corresponds to WKHORZHVWOHYHOVRIFLYLOYLROHQFHRYHUWLPH6RXUFHDXWKRUV¶HODERUDWLRQ 
 
 
Why Absence of Censorship Is Better Than Moderate Censorship 
 
To better assess the implications of this finding, it is useful to look more closely at the 
average number of agents who are active (a proxy for the overall level of civil 
violence), calm (not taking active part in protests) and jailed, for each possible level of 
censorship. 
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 6. Average number of active (red), calm (green) and jailed (black) agents as 
function of levels of censorship 
Legend: Higher vision means less censorship and implies less civil violence. The total number of agents 
LVFRQVWDQWDFURVVDOOVLPXODWLRQVDQGRYHUWLPH6RXUFHDXWKRUV¶HODERUDWLRQ 
 
Recall that one feature of the model is the presence of police officers, who can arrest 
protesters and keep them in jail for some time; one might therefore ask whether lower 
levels of violence correspond simply to having many agents in jail, so that unrest might 
restart as soon as they get out.13 Figure 6 above shows that this is not the case: while 
the average number of jailed agents increases with vision up to a certain point (about 7-
8), it then decreases again; and the number of agents that do not participate in protest 
remains stable up to about the same level of vision (of 7-8), then slightly increases. 
This result shows that the lower levels of civil violence that are observed under 
conditions of highest vision (and, equivalently, least censorship) are due to the choice 
of agents themselves to remain calm, not to repression by the police forces. 
Based on these remarks, another important point can be clarified. Arguably, the 
level of civil violence is only slightly lower with maximum vision (9 or 10 in the 
model, corresponding to total absence of censorship), than with a vision of about 7-8 
(corresponding to some moderate degree of censorship). Yet peaks of violence are 
                                                     
13
 The authors thank Mario Paolucci for raising this issue in a comment to the preliminary version of this paper, 
published as a blog post, and starting a discussion on the effects of policing and arrests (see 
http://www.bodyspacesociety.eu/2011/08/11/is-a-social-media-fuelled-uprising-the-worst-case-scenario-elements-
for-a-sociology-of-uk-riots/). 
9 
sharper when vision is 10 than when it is just 7-8. Therefore, one interpretation might 
be that a moderate degree of censorship is preferable to no censorship at all, in that it 
produces a fairly similar average level of violence, but with more stability. 14 Figure 6, 
however, shows that the level of stability in the moderate censorship scenario is 
achieved at the price of having a larger proportion of the population in prison. Indeed 
the average number of jailed agents reaches a maximum precisely when vision is 7. 
Instead, the low average violence that is produced in a no-censorship system (vision of 
10) derives largely from endogenous processes that lead society members themselves to 
choose to be calm ± and in this sense is better. 
 
 
Progressive Changes in Levels of Censorship Validate Previous 
Results 
 
So far, we have assumed that the value of the parameteU³YLVLRQ´± and thus, the degree 
of censorship ± remains constant during a single simulation run. The question that 
arises is to what extent our results differ if, starting from an initial situation in which 
access to social media is unrestricted (vision = 10), the government decides to exert 
censorship, whether partial (vision between 1 and 9) or total (vision = 0). To address 
WKLVTXHVWLRQZHFRQVLGHUWZRSRVVLEOHFDVHV³H[RJHQRXV´FKDQJHVWKDWPRGLI\YLVLRQ
at some pre-determined moments in time, and ³HQGRJHQRXV´FKDQJHV LQZKLFKYLVLRQ
varies whenever the system reaches some critical threshold, in particular in terms of 
number of agents engaged in protest. The former correspond to government measures 
that become enforceable at pre-defined times, independently of the state of the system 
at those times; the latter exemplify cases in which the government partially and 
progressively restricts access to online communications whenever it feels threatened by 
a high number of protesters.15 
Figure 7 presents results obtained with an exogenous change in levels of vision, 
in a simulation run of 1,000 time steps. Vision changes from 10 (no censorship) to 5 
(moderate censorship) after 200 time steps, and goes down to 0 (full censorship) after 
another 600 steps. The system first reproduces the pattern observed in Figure 3 above 
for a (constant) level of vision of 10; when vision becomes 5, it shifts very rapidly to 
the pattern that corresponds to this level of vision, portrayed in Figure 3; and after 
vision drops to 0, it moves to the pattern that Figure 3 shows to be characteristic of this 
level of vision. Interestingly, these patterns could be entirely predicted based on our 
first simulation of scenarios with constant values of vision over time, as represented in 
Figure 3. These results are fairly general in that qualitatively similar systemic 
behaviours are obtained with different combinations of values of vision and number of 
steps after which a change occurs; that is, moving from a level of 10 to 2 (instead of 5) 
                                                     
14
 We thank Juliette Rouchier and Sara Gorgoni for drawing our attention to this point, respectively in an e-mail 
exchange and during the Center for Business Network Analysis seminar, University of Greenwich. 
15
 Because the British government did not ultimately exert any explicit censorship of telecommunication networks in 
August 2011, these are theoretical scenarios and the specific values of parameters that we use must be taken as 
hypothetical only. 
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to 0. Hence, it can be concluded that the above analysis is also helpful to assess the 
effects of exogenous changes in vision. 
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 7. Number of calm, jailed and active agents when vision decreases from 10 to 5 
after 200 steps, and then to 0 after another 600 steps 
Legend: In each case, the system reproduces the pattern that is observed when vision is constant at the 
level considered, and that can be predicted based on Figure 3 above; after a change, it switches very 
rapidly from one pattern to the other. 
 
To study the effects of endogenous changes in vision in simulation runs of 1000 time 
steps each, we implement the rule that whenever the number of active agents exceeds a 
certain percentage of the total number of agents, vision declines by one point. 
Thresholds of 45 percent and above are never reached, and vision remains de facto 
constant at 10 all the time: the no-censorship solution is obtained. In all other cases, the 
system adjusts very rapidly to a state in which the level of vision stabilizes at some 
value below 10, and the numbers of active, jailed and calm agents reflect the same 
outcomes that are obtained when the corresponding level of vision is constant at that 
value (as illustrated in Figure 3 above). In particular, when the critical threshold is 
between 15 percent and 45 percent, vision reaches equilibrium at some intermediate 
value (between 3 and 9), corresponding to moderate censorship; if the threshold is 15 
percent or lower, vision stabilizes at 0 (full censorship), and the system exhibits a 
pattern that closely resembles the upper-left panel of Figure 3. We illustrate these three 
cases in Figure 8, with specific thresholds of, respectively, 30 percent, 10 percent and 
50 percent. Again the conclusion is that, aIWHU VRPH LQLWLDO DGMXVWPHQW WKH V\VWHP¶V
outcomes are consistent with the explanations outlined in the previous sections of this 
article. 
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 8. Number of calm, jailed and active agents (left panels) and levels of vision 
(right panels) 
Legend: Here vision starts with 10 and declines by one point whenever the proportion of active agents 
over the whole population reaches a critical threshold ± here, 30 percent (upper panels), 10 percent 
(middle panels) and 50 percent (lower panels). 
 
In all cases, the system rapidly stabilizes for a level of vision that remains constant over 
time, and reproduces the pattern observed when vision is constant at that level. Possible 
equilibrium levels of vision are 10 (for thresholds of 45 percent and above), 0 (for 
thresholds of 15 percent and below), or intermediate values (for all other thresholds). 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
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The case against Internet censorship presented here illustrates the importance of social 
analysis in contemporary politicaO VHWWLQJV 3ROLWLFLDQV¶ DQG SROLFH DXWKRULWLHV¶
GLVDSSURYDO RI ³VRFLDO MXVWLILFDWLRQV´ GLVPLVVHG DV ± at best ± a luxury one cannot 
afford in times of unrest, are to be considered symptomatic of a shoot-first-ask-later 
stance leading to ill-advised policy choices. 
Our paper attempts to respond to a social demand for clarification in a phase 
still dominated by conflicting discourses as to the possible causes and legitimate 
reactions to the 2011 outbursts of civil violence. The research directions gradually 
emerging are forking between the ones focussing on micro-motives (such as 
personality, culture, morals) and the ones relying on macro-indicators (such as poverty 
and social stratification) as explanatory factors. The computational method adopted 
here aims to bridge this divergence by showing how a set of rules operating at a micro 
level can account for collective dynamics. 
An approach detecting macro-structures starting from micro-interactions is 
subject to limitations (limitations of which we are aware of) and may not always be 
suitable for social research.16 Nevertheless along with Banos (2010), we consider 
agent-EDVHG VLPXODWLRQV DV ³FUXWFKHV´ IRU WKHRU\ EXLOGLQJ DOO WKH PRUH XVHIXO ZKHQ
adopting a stance consistent with established sociology. The present inquiry concerning 
the social factors influencing civil violence in a computer-mediated environment is 
grounded in the desire to generate public debate and political involvement, and our 
innovative ethno-FRPSXWDWLRQDO PHWKRGRORJLFDO FKRLFHV FDQ KHOS XV ³thematize our 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHZRUOGZHVWXG\´%XUDZR\DSWO\SRLQWVRXW 
 
When the ground beneath our feet is always shaking, we need a crutch. As 
social scientists we are thrown off balance by our presence in the world we 
study, by absorption in the society we observe, by dwelling alongside those we 
PDNH ³RWKHU´ %H\RQG LQGLYLGXDO LQYROYHPHQW LV WKH EURDGHU HWKQRJUDSKLF
predicament ± producing theories, concepts, and facts that destabilize the world 
we seek to comprehend. So, we desperately need methodology to keep us erect, 
while we navigate a terrain that moves and shifts even as we attempt to traverse 
it. 
 
Of course, studying computer-mediated communication via the civil violence model 
inspired by Epstein does not prevent other factors from coming into play. As shown in 
a recent paper by Klemens et al. (2010), rebellious outbursts are more likely given 
increased hardship (the recent financial crisis does seem to come into play here). Civil 
violence is also influenced by loss of government legitimacy ± which in this case seems 
consistent with the unpopular budget cuts promoted by David Cameron, not to mention 
the 2011 News Corporation phone hacking and corruption scandal. Finally, protest 
outbursts are less likely when the competitive advantage of activists is reduced. The 
growing presence of the Metropolitan Police and law enforcement initiatives on 
                                                     
16
 For a summary of criticism to this micro-PDFUR³7ZR/HYHO6WDQGSRLQW´6HH/DWRXUHWDO 
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Facebook,17 Flickr18 or Google Groups19 ± not for repressive but for intelligence-
gathering purposes ± can actually account for the subsequent limitation of violent 
RXWEXUVWE\UHGXFLQJWKHULRWHUV¶FRPPXQLFDWLRQDOYDQWDJHSRLQW 
Other studies have applied social simulation to censorship in situations of civil 
violence. Garlick and Chli (2009), for example, insist that restricting social 
communication pacifies rebellious societies, but has the opposite effect on peaceful 
ones. Our intention has been to show that, in the absence of robust indicators as to the 
rebelliousness of a given society, the choice of not restricting social communication 
turns out to be a judicious one for avoiding to trade democratic values and freedom of 
expression for an illusory sense of security. 
 
                                                     
17
 See http://www.facebook.com/pages/Supporting-the-Met-Police-against-the-London-rioters/152937041453243? 
sk=wall. 
18
 See http://www.flickr.com/photos/metropolitanpolice/sets/72157627267892973/. 
19
 See http://groups.google.com/group/london-riots-facial-recognition. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Time without riots, in percentage, corresponding to different levels of vision 
 
Vision levels % time spent as calm 
(no civil violence) 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
5 0 
6 0 
7 0 
8 0.3 
9 10.2 
10 32.5 
 
 
Table 2. Parameters used in the model 
 
Parameters Values 
Initial cop density 4 % 
Initial agent density 70 % 
Number of cops 64 
Number of agents 1120 
Government legitimacy 80 % 
Max jail term 30 time steps 
Vision 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A typical civil unrest pattern: outbursts of violence (red curve) punctuate long periods of stability when political tension is building up (blue 
curve). Source: Epstein (2002), Fig. 8. 
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Figure 2: A hypothetical social system, as can be represented graphically in the model, at time 0 (left panel) and after some time steps (central and right 
panels). Circles represent social agents, whose level of grievance is indicated by lighter or darker shades of green. Active protesters are coloured red and jailed 
SURWHVWHUVEODFN%OXHWULDQJOHVUHSUHVHQWSROLFHRIILFHUVJUH\DUHDVDUHHPSW\6RXUFHDXWKRUV¶HOaboration, based on Wilensky (2004). 
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Figure 3 : Red patterns represent number of violent protesters over time with different levels of social media censorship: from 0 vision (total censorship, upper 
left corner) to 10 vision (no censorship, lower right corner). Trend lines are in black. Time is measured as number of steps (1 to 1000). Source: authorV¶
elaboration. 
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Figure 4 : In the absence of censorship, high levels of social unrest are possible (see peaks in red line), but between uprisings, the social system is able to 
FRPHEDFNWRVLJQLILFDQWOHYHOVRITXLHWJUHHQOLQH6RXUFHDXWKRUV¶HODERUDWLRQ 
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Figure 5 : Average and variability of levels of civil violence (measured by number of active agents) as function of levels of censorship. Higher vision means less 
FHQVRUVKLSDQGOHVVFLYLOYLROHQFH6RXUFHDXWKRUV¶HODERUDWLRQ 
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Figure 6: Average number of active (red), quiet (green) and jailed (black) agents as function of levels of censorship. Higher vision means less censorship and 
OHVVFLYLOYLROHQFH7KHWRWDOQXPEHURIDJHQWVLVFRQVWDQWDFURVVDOOVLPXODWLRQVDQGRYHUWLPH6RXUFHDXWKRUV¶HODERUDWLon. 
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Figure 7: Number of quiet, jailed and active agents when vision decreases from 10 to 5 after 200 steps, and then to 0 after another 600 steps. In each case, 
the system reproduces the pattern observed when vision is constant at the level considered, and that can be predicted based on Figure 3 above; after a 
change, it switches very rapidly from one pattern to the other. 
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Figure 8: Number of quiet, jailed and active agents (left panels) and levels of vision (right panels) when vision starts from 10 and declines by one point 
whenever the proportion of active agents over the whole population reaches a critical threshold ±here, 30% (upper panels), 10% (middle panels) and 50% 
(lower panels). In all cases, the system rapidly stabilizes at a level of vision that remains constant over time, and then reproduces the pattern observed when 
vision is constant at that level. Possible equilibrium levels of vision are 10 (for thresholds of 45% and above), 0 (for thresholds of 15% and below), or 
intermediate values (for all other thresholds). 
 
